- 18 Jan, 2014 1 commit
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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- 17 Jan, 2014 5 commits
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
Makes secp256k1 about 4x faster
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
Only affects curves with nbits != pbits (currently only secp224k1)
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
The issue would happen for curves whose bitlength is not a multiple of eight (the only case is NIST P-521) with hashes that are longer than the bitlength of the curve: since the wides hash is 512 bits long, this can't happen. Fixing however as a matter of principle and readability.
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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- 10 Jan, 2014 2 commits
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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- 31 Dec, 2013 9 commits
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
rsa_rsassa_pss_verify()
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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- 30 Dec, 2013 23 commits
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Paul Bakker authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
Also document speed/memory trade-offs better.
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
Cuts peak usage by 25% :)
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
case The actual input / output buffer overhead is only 301 instead of 512. This requires a proper check on the padding_idx to prevent out of bounds reads. Previously a remote party could potentially trigger an access error and thus stop the application when sending a malicious packet having MAX_CONTENT_LEN of data, 32 bytes of MAC and a decrypted padlen of . This would result in reading from in_ctr + 13 + 32 + MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 1 - 1 for 256 bytes (including fake padding check). Or 13 + 32 bytes over the buffer length. We now reset padding_idx to 0, if it's clear that it will never be a valid padding (padlen > msg_len || msg_len + padlen + 256 > buffer_len)
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Paul Bakker authored
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard authored
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