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darcs-hash:20090121203232-db55f-87f2b58fd8c57c8375c591d3ae2ccc63fcc93866.gz

darcs-hash:20090121175435-db55f-ef51d7a977f631cb1e27f346d8a7a392027d6e83.gz

darcs-hash:20090121175325-db55f-2ee73a425c50d483913a800ff627081a8a1ef1bf.gz

darcs-hash:20090116194245-db55f-8144e4aa8e9c7918ffdf6a4f2be884f77b1093a8.gz

darcs-hash:20090116194236-db55f-bd5affb910137738ed773c19ae2925b0495ca85a.gz

darcs-hash:20090116194221-db55f-5cafdf9d346a02bd325a70afae04e2925e0f9490.gz

darcs-hash:20090116193743-db55f-103e52acd5f93eace7d4d9404eaa7eef8b5332f0.gz

darcs-hash:20090116192739-db55f-b6e4ec723e700deb455da1edc95b6ed2b8a93e60.gz

RFC 3261 allows the route set changes while dialog is in early state.

darcs-hash:20090116134229-db55f-09a83d76e27ea0e1795b8c256576e3fbb55cd2d7.gz

nta_leg_client_route() did not catch actually RFC 3261 section 12.1.2 feel
and spirit, not to speak about letter.

darcs-hash:20090116132208-db55f-6fc506ee850f7b701b8dfb65047428fe4e8a6867.gz

darcs-hash:20090115180629-db55f-7945babffb1c06d8fbd9ec16de23f351db3ca512.gz

Problem reported by Paulo Pizarro.

darcs-hash:20090115180600-db55f-d8465fb2460473a2e574f471eabba10c140b2b16.gz

sofia-sip/tport.h:
* tport_delivered_from_subjects() returns type (su_strlst_t const *)
* Export tport_subject_search()

sofia-sip/tport_tag.h + tport_tag.c:
* Remove TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_PEER()
  - Depreciated.  Use TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_POLICY instead.
  - Binary Compatibility is preserved.
* Add TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_POLICY()
  - tport can verify incoming and/or outgoing connections, using:
    1) Certificate Signatures only - or -
    2) Certificate Signatures and Certificate Subjects
* Add TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_DEPTH()
  - Restrict certificate chain verification to a set length.
* Add TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_DATE()
  - Disable notBefore/notAfter checking (application: embedded devices)
* Add TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_SUBJECTS()
  - Incoming connections must present client certificates with subjects
    that match an item in this list.
  - Intended Use: Proxy Authentication
* Replaced TPTAG_TRUSTED() with TPTAG_X509_SUBJECT()
  - Commented out for future use.
  - Intended Use: SIP User Identities in Server Certificates.
* Add appropriate doxygen documentation.

tport.c
* Add tport_subject_search()
  - Subject can be a hostname, IP Address, or a URI.
  - Valid subject examples include:
      example.com
      alice@example.com
      sip:alice@example.com
      sips:alice@example.com
* tport_by_addrinfo() matches tpn_canon against the subject list
    of reusable TLS connections.

tport_tls.h:
* Add tls_init_secondary()
* Remove tls_init_slave() & tls_init_client()

tport_tls.c:
* tls_verify_cb() supports TPTAG_TLS_VERIFY_DATE()
* tls_post_connection_check() verifies certificate subjects.
* tls_init_secondary()
  - Replaces tls_init_slave(), tls_init_client(), and tls_clone().

tport_type_tls.c:
* Removed erroneous reference to tport_tls_deliver()
* Fix a memory leak caused by duplicate calls to tls_clone().
* Populate the (tport_t *)->tp_subjects field with peer certificate data for
  new secondary connections.

darcs-hash:20090115155045-2152f-aaec406d8e5dbf146949d4d3cbc9f56e201cba46.gz

Asterisk (v 1.2.7.1) does response with 484 if a client does send a refer
with a @ReferTo header to an unknown number.  This is therefore not
fundamentally wrong and the dialog should not be destroyed!

darcs-hash:20090115153834-a156d-fc3e550ec73db7199f2bb99e776422e5774c8c7e.gz

darcs-hash:20090115153308-db55f-019b74dc8b06aec31aa1f145af116ed64db36e98.gz

darcs-hash:20090115144056-db55f-0baa02497db3bfbe38084b850eb5d80662f846ff.gz

darcs-hash:20090115124804-db55f-5c2eb9b811556a7174cb306f754c9b48ec902712.gz

NTATAG_GRAYLIST added in 1.12,8, NTATAG_MAX_PROCEEDING() in 1.12.9,
NTATAG_TLS_RPORT() in 1.12.10

darcs-hash:20090114123556-db55f-bb76b6b769719f6fc684b1278f8b1e9508f8f9f6.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222340-db55f-ff4739aae1968f1c599e0fbe56fd2d277570af1a.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222309-db55f-2d3f83d4c19866c646a4ca4f5eb327fd5c84a03b.gz

Cleaned whitespace, too.

darcs-hash:20090113222239-db55f-da765729f3301a11e60b725c3c4a6986961a0f35.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222144-db55f-6c4a5d1657a772f450d638e5c6921767d8cd07dd.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222056-db55f-4fe35af762b608d1feeafe58d3b1209d3566408c.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222030-db55f-dd22cd1f0ecfb4a29fcee27bd4c20372b774e538.gz

darcs-hash:20090113222006-db55f-7754f5133136a84da3bbe835dba65d8073eec40d.gz

darcs-hash:20090113211959-db55f-41fb49442cbdd599e489946032429e655857266d.gz

darcs-hash:20090113211902-db55f-37d3c9643cced26d360e4900fa589e0cd040659d.gz

darcs-hash:20090113161010-db55f-537e0b52450189128a7c4b7d0f4b4ae9806f2af4.gz

darcs-hash:20090113210325-db55f-af3aaab904c5cf499409878684958597430624cb.gz

Thanks for Liu Yang for reporting the problem.

darcs-hash:20090113205950-db55f-8ff57de9c25348058069e910c2f3aca1a2e7518e.gz

darcs-hash:20090112142914-db55f-56a8b8182b7f8c7ec4b0903b4de58379f933723d.gz

Making poll mechanism name matching case-insensitive.

darcs-hash:20090112142707-db55f-97d17e7fa8d5b7079ea9abf92bf6e300f14a77ea.gz

If there was multiple challenges with different authentication schemes,
auc_has_authorization() required that all were supported (and used) before
authentication could proceed.

darcs-hash:20090109205102-db55f-a800189f89d48b5e1af7e92fecdb75ffe46b5951.gz

darcs-hash:20090109195156-db55f-9b56dfe059572748388bc82ce04d7c60d7cc5b5a.gz

According to the (informational) RFC 4321 section 1.2 Timer E is not altered
during the transition to Proceeding.

darcs-hash:20090109192653-daa5a-2e208b758f6b877bfbcb175e7247bf8be82bcf0c.gz

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darcs-hash:20090108211228-db55f-5f04433ac86cd1bfb8c44513d584698bccff7666.gz

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darcs-hash:20090108205649-db55f-5fcf235445ca01c4a53423cb208cef3b1e8af687.gz